One of the most critical but least celebrated airlifts in history unfolded over a desperate 32 days in the fall of 1973. An armada of Military Airlift Command aircraft carried thousands of tons of materiel over vast distances into the midst of the most ferocious fighting the Middle East had ever witnessed — the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. MAC airlifters — T-tailed C-141s and massive C-5As — went in harm's way, vulnerable to attack from fighters as they carved a demanding track across the Mediterranean, and to missiles and sabotage as they off-loaded in Israel.
Though not as famous as the 1948–49 Berlin Airlift or as massive as the 1990–91 Desert Storm airlift, this 1973 operation was a watershed event. Code-named "Nickel Grass," it restored a balance of power and helped Israel survive a coordinated, life-threatening Soviet-backed assault from Egypt and Syria. It proved the Air Force concept of global mobility based on jet-powered transport aircraft. The airlift also transformed the image of the C-5 from that of expensive lemon to enduring symbol of American might.
The World on the Brink
In the summer and fall of 1973, the Middle East seethed with tensions. Six years earlier, in June 1967, Israeli forces had conquered vast swaths of land controlled by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Cairo and Damascus failed over the years to persuade or force Israel to relinquish its grip on the land, and by 1973 the stalemate had become intolerable.
Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Syria's Hafez al-Assad meticulously planned their 1973 offensive — one they hoped would reverse Israeli gains of the earlier war and put an end to Arab humiliation. The Arab states had trained well and Moscow had supplied equipment on a colossal scale, including 600 advanced surface-to-air missiles, 300 MiG-21 fighters, 1,200 tanks, and hundreds of thousands of tons of consumable war materiel. The war was timed to begin on the holiest of Jewish religious days: Yom Kippur.
On paper, the Arabs held a huge advantage in troops, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. This was offset, in Israeli minds, by the Jewish state's superior technology, advanced mobilization capability, and interior lines of communication. Despite unmistakable signs of increasing Arab military capability, Israeli leaders remained unworried — even complacent, confident in their ability to repel any attack. It was a confidence that would cost them dearly.
Trapped by Complacency: The Attack Begins
The Israeli government became unequivocally convinced of impending war just hours before the Arab nations attacked at 2:05 p.m. local time on October 6. Prime Minister Golda Meir, despite her immense popularity and her government's awareness of what was coming, refused to carry out a pre-emptive strike. She was concerned that the US might withhold critical aid if Washington perceived Israel to be the aggressor — a calculation that would prove costly in the opening days of the war.
On the southern front, the onslaught began with a 2,000-cannon barrage across the Suez Canal. Egyptian assault forces swept across the waterway and plunged deep into Israeli-held territory. At the same time, crack Syrian units launched a potent offensive in the Golan Heights. The Arab forces fought with efficiency and cohesion, rolling over shocked Israeli defenders. Arab air forces attacked Israeli airfields, radar installations, and missile sites.
Day four of the war found Israel's once-confident military suffering from the effects of the bloodiest mauling of its short existence. Egypt had taken the famous Bar Lev Line — a series of some 30 sand, steel, and concrete bunkers strung across the Sinai. Egyptian commandos ranged behind Israeli lines causing havoc. In the north, the Syrian attack was not halted until October 10. Losses in armored vehicles and combat aircraft were grievous on both sides, but for Israel they were existential. Israeli estimates of ammunition and fuel consumption proved totally inadequate. It was the casualty rate, however, that stunned Prime Minister Meir and shocked even the legendary Defense Minister Gen. Moshe Dayan — men who had seen war before but never anything like this.
Washington Dithers
Half a world away, the United States was in a funk, unable or unwilling to act decisively. Washington was in the throes of not only post-Vietnam moralizing on Capitol Hill but also the agony of Watergate, both of which impaired the leadership of President Richard M. Nixon. Four days into the war, Washington was blindsided again by another political disaster — the forced resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew.
The initial US reaction to the invasion was one of confusion and contradiction. Leaders tried to strike a balance between traditional US support of Israel, the need to maintain a still-tenuous superpower détente with the Soviet Union, and a desire to avoid a threatened Arab embargo of oil shipments to the West. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was already resupplying Egypt and Syria by air — making American hesitation all the more consequential.
Nixon, in response to a personal plea from Meir, made the crucial decision on October 9 to resupply Israel. But four more days would pass before a final decision on how the resupply would be executed. Initially, planners proposed that Israel carry out the entire airlift using its own El Al commercial airliners. (Israel did ultimately fly eight El Al aircraft, delivering 5,500 tons.) US commercial carriers were approached — and refused, every one of them, concerned about Arab reprisals against their businesses. MAC's inquiries received the same negative response. Then it was suggested that MAC assist by flying materiel to Lajes Field in the Portuguese Azores, where Israeli transports could pick it up.
Then, on October 12, Nixon made the decision that would change the course of the war. MAC would handle the entire airlift. Tel Aviv's Lod/Ben-Gurion air complex would be the off-load point.
"Send everything that can fly." — President Richard M. Nixon, October 12, 1973
MAC Springs Into Action
The US Air Force had been quietly preparing right along. Gen. George S. Brown, USAF Chief of Staff, had already telephoned Gen. Paul K. Carlton, MAC commander, to begin loading aircraft with materiel but hold them within the US pending the formal order. Carlton put his commanders on alert and contacted Gen. Jack J. Catton of Air Force Logistics Command. More than 20 sites across the United States were designated as cargo pick-up points. Equipment, some taken directly from war-reserve stocks, began pouring in.
Less than nine hours after Nixon's decision, MAC had C-141s and C-5s ready to depart. The fleet consisted of 268 C-141 Starlifters and 77 C-5A Galaxies. Carlton knew he could sustain a steady flow of three C-141s every two hours and four C-5s every four hours — indefinitely. He described MAC as a conduit through which materiel would flow in a well-adjusted stream, promising that "once this flow starts, it is going to come like a bushel basket of oranges just being dumped."
The White House was impatient. Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, called Carlton: "We'll have to get them moving, or we'll lose our jobs." Carlton, confident in his operation, held his course. He waived crew rest requirements, weight limitations, daily utilization restrictions, and routine maintenance demands — extraordinary steps demanded by extraordinary circumstances.
The Route: A Thread Across the Mediterranean
The threat of an oil embargo frightened US allies. With a single exception, every one of them denied landing and overflight rights. The exception was Portugal, which — after hard bargaining — essentially agreed to look the other way as traffic mushroomed at Lajes Field. Daily departure flights from Lajes grew from one to 40 in a matter of days. Without Lajes, the airlift as conducted would have been impossible.
The average distance from US departure points — McGuire AFB, Dover AFB, and Charleston AFB — to Lajes was 3,297 miles. It was another 3,163 miles from Lajes to Lod/Ben-Gurion. The route from Lajes flew to Gibraltar and then followed a narrow path over the Mediterranean, deliberately placed along the Flight Information Region boundary line dividing the airspace of hostile African states to the south from "friendly" European states to the north — a 6,460-mile lifeline stitched across the ocean.
The threat of Arab interception was real. The US Navy's Sixth Fleet acted as protector until the transports came within approximately 200 miles of Israel, at which point Israeli Air Force fighters took over. Several unidentified aircraft were spotted and threatening radio calls were made. No overt hostile action was ever taken — but nobody on those flights relaxed until the wheels touched down at Lod.
First Touchdown at Lod
Initial flights were delayed by 50-knot crosswinds at Lajes, generating White House fury that supplies had not instantly reached Israel. The first C-5 (Tail No. 00461) designated for Lod encountered engine trouble and returned to Lajes; Col. Donald R. Strobaugh and his Airlift Control Element team transferred to a C-141.
The first C-5 to land at Lod touched down at 22:01 Zulu. It carried 97 tons of 105mm howitzer shells — arriving at a moment when Israeli forces were down to their last supplies of ammunition. Another 829 tons were delivered in the next 24 hours. Even as Israeli workers unloaded those first cargo aircraft, huge formations of Israeli and Egyptian armor maneuvering just 100 miles to the southwest were locked in a desperate tank battle — the largest clash of armor since the Battle of Kursk in World War II.
The arriving MAC aircraft were greeted ecstatically by the Israelis. Crews received red-carpet treatment. Israel put in place an express cargo-handling system: materiel unloaded from the transports was typically at the front in Syria in about three hours and in the Sinai in less than ten hours.
The Airlift at Full Tempo
The original 4,000-ton airlift requirement grew daily. After the first day, USAF set the daily flow at four C-5s and 12 C-141s. After October 21, it raised the level to six C-5s and 17 C-141s and maintained it through October 30, when demand finally began to drop. The continuous flow of aircraft was punishing on crews — MAC responded by positioning relief crews for the C-141s and using augmented crews on the C-5s. A special pool of navigators was created for the vital but demanding task of navigating the Mediterranean corridor.
The cargo flowing through that air bridge transformed the war's character. Because it eliminated the need to husband ammunition and other consumables, the unbroken flood of US materiel enabled Israeli forces to go on the offensive. New weapons that arrived in the latter stages proved decisive — Maverick and TOW anti-tank missiles and extensive electronic countermeasures equipment that shielded Israeli fighters from the Arab missile batteries that had devastated them in the opening days.
The Offensive and the Nuclear Brink
In the north, Israel's ground forces recovered all territory that had been lost and began to march toward Damascus. In the Sinai, tank forces led by Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon smashed back across the Suez Canal, encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the western bank, and threatened Ismailia, Suez City, and Cairo itself. Egypt and Syria — which had previously rejected any negotiated settlement — now felt compelled to accept a cease-fire arrangement hammered out by Washington and Moscow on October 22.
Israel was reluctant to comply, wishing to press its advantage to the limit. The Soviet Union raised the stakes to their highest level: Moscow declared that if the US could not bring Israel to heel, it would take unilateral action to impose a settlement. On October 24, the United States responded by taking its armed forces to a worldwide DEFCON III alert — implying readiness for nuclear operations if necessary. It was the most dangerous moment in superpower relations since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
After several abortive efforts, an effective cease-fire finally took hold on October 28. The airlift officially ended on November 14.
The Final Accounting
Israel suffered 10,800 killed and wounded — a traumatic loss for a nation of some three million people — plus 100 aircraft and 800 tanks. The Arab nations suffered 17,000 killed or wounded and 8,000 prisoners, and lost 500 aircraft and 1,800 tanks. The Yom Kippur War was over. And the airlift that had made Israel's survival possible was complete.
| Metric | Figure |
|---|---|
| Duration | 32 days (Oct 14 – Nov 14, 1973) |
| Total tonnage delivered | 22,395 tons |
| C-5A Galaxy missions | 145 sorties |
| C-141 Starlifter missions | 422 sorties |
| Outsize cargo (C-5 only) | 2,264.5 tons (M-60 tanks, 155mm howitzers, CH-53 helicopters, A-4E components) |
| C-5A reliability rate | 81% |
| C-141 reliability rate | 93% |
| Abort rate | Under 2% of all planned flights |
| Accidents | Zero |
| US departure bases | McGuire AFB (NJ), Dover AFB (DE), Charleston AFB (SC) |
| Staging base | Lajes Field, Azores, Portugal |
| Off-load point | Lod/Ben-Gurion Airport, Tel Aviv |
| Route distance (US → Israel) | ~6,460 miles via Lajes and Gibraltar |
| Personnel at Lajes ALCE | 1,300+ |
| MAC fleet available | 268 C-141s + 77 C-5As |
| El Al civilian contribution | 8 aircraft, 5,500 tons |
| MAC commander | Gen. Paul K. Carlton |
| Time from Nixon order to aircraft ready | Less than 9 hours |
Lessons and Legacy
Nickel Grass taught the Air Force lessons large and small. Lajes was a godsend — one the US must not take for granted. The Air Force immediately established a requirement for aerial refueling as standard MAC practice, so that airlifters could operate without forward bases in a future emergency. It was also made clear that commercial airlines could not be expected to volunteer their services; future access to commercial lift would require activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet — as indeed happened during the Gulf War of 1990–91. Nickel Grass also led directly to the consolidation of all airlift aircraft under Military Airlift Command, designated a specified command on February 1, 1977.
Most importantly, the C-5 Galaxy — ridiculed in the media as an expensive military mistake — proved itself the finest military airlift aircraft in history. Its ability to carry enormous quantities of cargo economically, lift outsize equipment that nothing else could move, and refuel in flight fully justified every dollar spent on the program.
President Sadat himself later acknowledged the turning point. After the war, he concluded that he could have defeated the Israeli army — but not the United States Air Force. The airlift, and the political commitment it represented, was what changed the outcome.
"For generations to come, all will be told of the miracle of the immense planes from the United States bringing in the material that meant life for our people." — Prime Minister Golda Meir
Reader's Digest called it simply: "The Airlift That Saved Israel." After a quarter century of writing about airpower, I cannot think of a more accurate epitaph for Operation Nickel Grass.